INTRODUCTION
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit racial discrimination in employment. 1 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 2 seven years later, the Supreme Court read the law as imposing liability for disparate impact: facially neutral actions that were not intended to be discriminatory, but resulted in discriminatory effects. 3 In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to codify the standard set out in Griggs and allowed a plaintiff to establish an initial showing of disparate impact liability based on statistical disparities in outcomes between racial groups. 4 Yet, liability based on statistics alone raises significant constitutional problems. 5 Although the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with the rights of individuals, 6 disparate impact liability is triggered by disparities between racial groups. 7 11 in which it hinted that some applications of disparate impact liability were constitutionally permissible. 12 In that case, the Court interpreted the Fair Housing Act (enacted as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968) to include a cause of action for disparate impact. 13 It explained that raceneutral remedies of the sort that had been applied in fair housing cases over the last four decades were constitutionally unproblematic, 14 but warned that remedial orders requiring racial targets or quotas might raise constitutional problems. 15 Those sorts of remedies can result from Title VII lawsuits. For example, one consent decree in a Title VII disparate impact lawsuit ordered the defendant to hire "12 African American applicants and 18 Hispanic applicants from the . . . 2012 hiring process." 16 The district court in the case foreclosed the possibility of an equal protection challenge when it prevented the firefighters' union from intervening in the lawsuit, leaving open the question of whether a court would review the racial quota listed therein under strict scrutiny 17 or a deferential, rational-basis standard.
Part I of this Article recounts the history of disparate impact liability, the constitutional problems with the theory, and the potential for an as-applied challenge to the use of remedial racial quotas in Title VII disparate impact cases. Part II shows why this is a difficult question. It examines court rulings on the census, 19 the use of race in 8 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003) (invalidating the University of Michigan's undergraduate affirmative action program). 9 Primus, Equal Protection & Disparate Impact, supra note 5, at 494. 10 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring). 11 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) . 12 Id. at 2522. 13 Id. 21 and fair housing 22 to show why some scholars have argued that disparate impact liability does not raise significant constitutional problems, regardless of how it is applied. 23 Those commentators contend that the standard of review is determined by the normative reasonableness of the law, and a court may apply deferential review whenever it concludes that a law is desirable. 24 Part III demonstrates why that is not so. It shows why cases on the census, suspect descriptions, school zoning, and fair housing are fully consistent with requiring strict scrutiny of explicit racial quotas contained in disparate impact remedial orders. In doing so, I will draw on four principles distilled from key equal protection cases: burden allocation, expressive harm, universalism, and context.
I. DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

A. Title VII's Disparate Impact Provisions: A Brief History
In 1868, the nation ratified the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 25 For the next century, America struggled to live up to that promise. Through infamous Jim Crow laws, which explicitly differentiated between races, state and local governments authorized racial discrimination in virtually every facet of life. their Jim Crow laws, which had up until that time been limited primarily to passenger trains and schools. The segregation of the races was extended to residential areas, parks, hospitals, theaters, waiting rooms, and bathrooms. There were even statutes and ordinances which authorized separate phone booths for Negroes and whites, which required that textbooks used by children of one race be kept separate from those used by the other, and which required that Negro and white prostitutes be kept in separate districts.").
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In 1962, travelers at train stations were escorted to different waiting rooms designed to separate whites and blacks. 27 Restaurants hung signs saying "whites only" and "no blacks allowed."
28 Southern states bent on curbing minority participation in voting "came up with new ways to discriminate as soon as existing ones were struck down."
29
It was no different with employment. In the early 1960s, mining companies discriminated against black coal miners "wherever coal was mined."
30 Employers intentionally sparked racial hostilities by providing less experienced Polish workers with preferential treatment. 31 Black workers in all professions were forced into undesirable positions with little chance at earning promotions.
32
In recognition of these problems, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 33 Title II of the Act dealt with discrimination in places of public accommodation. 34 Title VII sought to remedy discrimination in employment. 35 The statute made it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,"
36 or "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee" 37 for those reasons. The statute unambiguously imposed liability for "disparate treatment," also known as intentional discrimination.
38 There was, however, an open question as to whether the law implicitly imposed liability for actions that resulted in an adverse effect on a protected group, but were taken without any invidious purpose. 27 See STEVEN D. CLASSEN, WATCHING JIM CROW: THE STRUGGLES OVER MISSISSIPPI TV, 1955 -1969 , at 87 (2004 44 The employer in the case had openly discriminated against minority applicants, 45 and the changes that it made after Title VII went into effect were blatant attempts to evade the statute's requirements. 46 The employer's test for new applicants, which had replaced a system of forthright discrimination against minorities, was designed for those with a high school education-and administered at a time when most blacks did not go to high school. 47 Although the tests at issue in Griggs strongly suggested disparate treatment, the Court's endorsement of disparate impact liability 39 See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 211 (2010) . 40 For instance, an employer may use a pen-and-paper test and hire every applicant who scores above a certain grade. If 80% of white applicants and 72% of black applicants pass the test, there is no significant adverse effect on black applicants because the comparative selection rate for blacks was 90%. 59 But if 80% of white applicants and 60% of black applicants pass the test, there is a significant adverse effect on blacks because the comparative selection rate for blacks was 75%. 60 Second, an employer can rebut an initial showing of an adverse effect on a protected class by convincing the court that the business practice at issue has "a manifest relationship to the employment in question."
61 Also known as the business necessity standard, an employer might be able to satisfy this requirement if it can prove that test scores are correlated with job performance. 62 Third, if a court holds that the tests at issue are job related, the plaintiff can still win if it shows that "other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship'" just as well. 63 showed that a running exercise was reasonably correlated with job performance because those who passed the run test "had a success rate on the job standards ranging from 70% to 90%" and the "success rate of the individuals who failed the run test ranged from 5% to 20%").
63 Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). 64 Cf. Johnson v. City of Memphis, 770 F.3d 464, 472 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that the "less discriminatory alternatives" prong requires the plaintiff to "demonstrate: (1) the availability Successful disparate impact lawsuits under Title VII, unlike successful disparate impact lawsuits under the Fair Housing Act, have led to remedies that raise constitutional difficulties. 65 In Inclusive Communities, the Court held that the Fair Housing Act encompassed a cause of action for disparate impact.
66 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court emphasized the history of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act, observing that remedies ordered in successful lawsuits over the last four decades have led to race-neutral means to terminate unjustified barriers to fair housing 67 rather than remedies imposing racial quotas. 68 Title VII lawsuits in employment occasionally lead to the same remedy, only requiring the employer to stop the specific practice creating the disparate impact. 69 After Inclusive Communities, one can predict that such practices are safe from a constitutional attack unless a court finds a meaningful difference between employment and fair housing. In other cases, however, successful disparate impact lawsuits in employment have led to racial quotas, 70 which the Court in Inclusive Communities warned would raise serious constitutional problems. 71 
Racial Remedies in Disparate Impact Cases and the Looming Constitutional Challenge
Title VII remedial orders that require racial quotas seem ripe for an as-applied constitutional challenge. Several court orders and consent decrees in recent years have imposed just such remedies.
72 United States v. City of Austin 73 is one recent example. In 2014, the Department of Justice filed suit against the City of Austin for a disparate impact resulting from the city's examination for entry-level firefighters. 74 The parties entered into a consent decree on the same day. 75 The complaint did not allege that the city engaged in intentional discrimination, and the United States conceded that the city did not do so. 76 Although the governmental interest of remedying intentional discrimination was absent in the case, 77 the settlement included a batch of remedies such as quota-based hiring for thirty minority firefighters, 78 allotted between "12 AfricanAmerican and 18 Hispanic [applicants] from the 2012 hiring process." 79 
United States v. New Jersey
80 contained similar facts. In 2010, the United States sued New Jersey and the State's Civil Services Commission, alleging that the Commission's selection process for the position of police sergeant produced a disparate impact on African American and Hispanic applicants, who passed the promotional examination at lower rates than their white counterparts. 81 The parties entered into a consent decree, which the district court approved over 468 written objections, including many from those who had already passed the promotional exam, but were concerned about being skipped over for lower scoring minority applicants. 82 Like the consent decree in United States v. City of Austin, the New Jersey consent decree included a racial quota as a remedy, dividing sixty-eight priority promotions among forty-eight African American and twenty Hispanic candidates. 83 Court judgments in Title VII disparate impact lawsuits can also mandate racial quotas. In Lewis v. City of Chicago, 84 a group of black firefighter applicants brought suit on behalf of themselves and every other black firefighter applicant who took Chicago's 1995 written firefighter examination. 85 The case went to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the unexciting proposition that plaintiffs in Title VII disparate impact cases may file their claims within 300 days after the employer executes the allegedly unlawful practice. 86 But things got more interesting on remand. 
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court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on their disparate impact claims, ordering the City to remedy the Title VII violation by hiring 132 black firefighters and granting them retroactive seniority. 87 But since the plaintiff class consisted of every black applicant to the 1995 exam, there were around 6,000 people eligible for relief. 88 The court did not order any sort of merit-based test for the applicants, opting instead for "an imperfect solution" that the "new hires be chosen by lot." 89 As exemplified by all these cases, a constitutional challenge to Title VII's remedial orders containing racial quotas is fully feasible. 90 That is especially so given the deep tension between disparate impact liability and the Equal Protection Clause.
B. The "War" Between Disparate Impact and the Equal Protection Clause
Although Title VII was enacted to enforce the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 statutory liability for disparate impact has long been divorced from constitutional notions of discrimination. Just five years after the Court interpreted Title VII to include a disparate impact cause of action in Griggs, it rejected a constitutional challenge to a written test administered by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 92 The employment practice at issue was a police examination that had a significant adverse impact on black applicants, who failed at a rate around four times higher than their white counterparts. 93 At the time, public employers such as the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department were not subject to Title VII. 94 Thus, plaintiffs brought their disparate impact claim under the Equal Protection Clause rather than Title VII. 95 The Court rejected the applicants' claims because they had not showed that the police department acted with a discriminatory purpose, which the Court held was a necessary element of an equal protection claim. White House officials echoed these concerns. 100 A report by Attorney General Edwin Meese warned that the Supreme Court could "Define Discrimination in Terms of 'Disparate Impact' and Thereby Use the Equal Protection Clause to Require Race and Gender 'Affirmative Action' Policies." 101 Disparate impact liability was also instantly controversial among academics. A law review article published the year after Griggs warned that "employers may use privately imposed quotas" to avoid disparate impact liability. 102 In another influential article four decades later, Richard Primus discussed the "serious conceptual tensions between modern equal protection doctrine and disparate impact law." initial test results in the process. 106 A group of white and Hispanic firefighters then challenged the decision on both statutory and constitutional grounds, alleging that the city's decision to discard the scores of the first test was discriminatory under both Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. 107 The Supreme Court held that the city's decision to scrap the initial test results violated the disparate treatment provision of Title VII because the city lacked a strong basis in evidence that it would have otherwise been liable under the disparate impact statute.
108 But since the statutory standard of disparate treatment under Title VII is the same as the constitutional standard for intentional discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, 109 it is safe to say that the Court could have just as easily invalidated New Haven's actions on constitutional grounds.
110 Indeed, although the Court's statutory holding in Ricci made it unnecessary to resolve the constitutionality of disparate impact, Justice Scalia warned, in a separate opinion, that "the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later."
111 He urged the Court to "begin thinking about how-and on what terms-to make peace between" Title VII's disparate impact provisions and the Equal Protection Clause.
112
The latest battle was fought in Inclusive Communities, which asked "whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act."
113 Although the case dealt with a question of statutory interpretation, amici on both sides seized the opportunity to discuss the constitutionality of disparate impact liability. [Vol. 24:1169
The Court held that disparate impact claims were cognizable under the Fair Housing Act (FHA). 115 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court observed that the results-oriented phrase "otherwise make unavailable" in the Fair Housing Act refers to the consequences of an action rather than the defendant's intent. 116 This language, the Court added, was similar to language in two other antidiscrimination statutes that it had previously interpreted to encompass disparate impact liability: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
117 Thus, like those statutes, the Fair Housing Act encompassed a cause of action for disparate impact.
As a constitutional matter, the Court noted that remedies imposed in successful fair housing lawsuits have always been limited in key respects to avoid serious constitutional questions.
118 These remedies comprised of eliminating artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to integration via race-neutral means.
119 The Court's holding did not fully answer questions about the constitutionality of disparate impact under Title VII. 120 Even proponents of disparate impact in employment have argued that "the only way to avoid disparate-impact liability is to engage in race-based remedies, not race-based thinking about what neutral criterion to adopt." 121 Moreover, disparate impact liability in fair housing, unlike in employment, "does not encourage racial classifications or redistribute zero-sum assets from whites to minorities."
122
As the Court warned in Inclusive Communities, remedial orders that impose racial targets or quotas-like those that arise under Title VII-may raise difficult constitutional questions.
123
C. The Key Battleground
The crucial question today is whether remedial orders imposing racial quotas can survive an as-applied challenge. The answer hinges upon the standard of review.
124
Strict scrutiny, the most demanding standard of judicial review, requires the government to prove that its action both serves a compelling governmental interest 125 By contrast, rational basis review gives the government much more leeway. Laws subject to that standard are "accorded a strong presumption of validity," 134 and the party challenging the law must negate every conceivable basis which might support it.
135 Judicial deference to laws is so great that some have questioned whether the standard provides meaningful review at all.
136
Inclusive Communities is the latest case exacerbating the tension between rational basis review and strict scrutiny for disparate impact remedial orders containing racial quotas. Strict scrutiny is triggered in two situations: when a law contains an express racial classification (i.e., mentions race) 137 and when government action is taken as compelling: remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and encouraging diversity in higher education 
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remedial orders mandating only an injunction to halt the offending practice would only be subject to rational basis review in fair housing cases, there is a good possibility that the same remedy in employment disparate impact cases would be subject to the same type of review. But remedies imposing racial quotas implicate equal protection concerns to a much greater degree 149 and likely trigger strict scrutiny even after the Court's decision in Inclusive Communities.
The consequences of applying strict scrutiny in equal protection cases are significant. There are only two governmental interests that the Court has recognized as compelling: remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and an interest in diversity in higher education. 150 The compelling interest of remedying intentional discrimination cannot justify a disparate impact remedial order containing racial quotas. The Court has consistently required a particularized showing of the prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved rather than an amorphous claim of societal discrimination. 151 In theory, courts could read Title VII's disparate impact provisions in a way that limits it as an evidentiary dragnet to smoke out instances of intentional discrimination. 152 In practice, they do not do so. 153 Rather, Title VII's disparate impact provisions are often used to remedy "structural discrimination," and impose liability on "employer[s] acting without bias." 154 Title VII's procedural mechanics confirm this point. The plaintiff in a disparate impact lawsuit is not required to plead intentional discrimination, 155 and the absence of a good-faith defense casts serious doubt on viewing disparate impact liability solely as an evidentiary dragnet for intentional discrimination. 156 Nor could an interest in diversity justify disparate impact liability under Title VII. As the Court explained in Parents Involved, a compelling interest in diversity was tolerable in the unique context of higher education given "the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment," and the fact that "universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." 157 That setting [Vol. 24:1169 is altogether different from employment. 158 Thus, as the Deputy Solicitor General conceded in Ricci, the government's interest in a diverse workplace cannot be advanced by racial classifications.
159
Professor Eang Ngov has identified one more interest as compelling, arguing that disparate impact liability serves the interest in "removing barriers and providing equal employment opportunities." 160 That is a laudable goal, of course, as there are many unnecessary barriers to economic opportunity in the country today. 161 But courts generally review those barriers under rational basis review 162 and permit most of them to remain in effect. 163 Moreover, the Supreme Court has suggested that government programs designed to eliminate barriers cannot serve as a compelling governmental interest if they eliminate barriers for only certain racial groups. 164 In Grutter, the Court hinted that the University of Michigan Law School could have de-emphasized the role of standardized test scores in admissions decisions for all students, 165 but no one argued that the University had a compelling interest in doing so for only underrepresented minorities.
166 Professor Ngov's proposed interest in removing barriers to equal employment opportunities thus cannot serve as a compelling interest for imposing a racial quota in a Title VII disparate impact remedial order.
That 167 Academics use these examples to say that courts must make judgments about "normative reasonableness" of racial quotas in disparate impact remedial orders before deciding whether to subject them to strict scrutiny. 168 
A. The Census
Remedial orders involving racial quotas lists racial groups, 169 and thus a straightforward application of strict scrutiny seems appropriate. 170 But although the Supreme Court has often repeated the maxim that all racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, 171 a case applying rational basis review in an equal protection challenge to the census leads observers to believe that this maxim is incorrect.
172
The Constitution directs Congress to conduct a census every ten years, 173 and every census since the Founding has included a question about race. 174 In Morales v. Daley, a group of five plaintiffs complained that two questionnaires from the 2000 census violated the Equal Protection Clause because they required individuals to self-identify by race. 175 Applying rational basis review, the court affirmed the constitutionality of the census. 176 It reasoned that there is a "distinction between collecting demographic data so that the government may have the information it believes . . . it needs in order to govern, and governmental use of suspect classifications without a compelling interest." As an obvious racial classification subject to mere rational basis review, the census appears to have leveled a significant blow to strict adherents of an anticlassification principle. 178 According to some, Morales stands for the proposition that only classifications with particular effects are objectionable. 179 The rationale could be extended to apply deferential review for racial quotas in remedial orders.
B. Police Practices
Government decisions made on the basis of race are also considered classifications and generally subject to strict scrutiny. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, for example, the Court famously struck down an ordinance that was selectively enforced by a city to close down laundries owned by Chinese persons. 180 More recently, in Johnson v. California, the Court invalidated an unwritten policy of segregating new prisoners for up to sixty days. 181 Disparate impact remedial orders that call for racial quotas also fall within this category. Whereas the government in Yick Wo used race as the determinative factor in deciding who should be burdened by its action, quota-based remedial orders use race to determine who should benefit.
But this rule also has its exceptions. Descriptions of suspects in police reports frequently contain the suspect's race. 182 Yet, courts have generally reviewed suspect descriptions containing race in police investigations under a deferential standard-at least in instances where race is used in conjunction with other identifiers. 183 In Brown v. City of Oneonta, the Second Circuit held that the police may use race in determining who it should detain in response to a reported crime. 184 The case involved an equal protection challenge brought by several black males who were questioned in response to a midnight assault. 185 The court concluded that "[i]n acting on the description provided by the victim of the assault-a description that included race as one of several elements-[the police] did not engage in a suspect racial classification that would draw strict scrutiny." 186 Courts thus give the police leeway when they are looking for a specific perpetrator in response to a specific crime, such as describing the suspects in a bank robbery as "three slim black men between 20 and 25 years old," wearing dark clothing and between 5'5 and 5'8. 187 Courts do not defer to the police, however, in cases of racial profiling, such as random police sweeps targeted racial groups and aimed at preventing future crimes. 188 For instance, conducting highway searches on the basis of race because different races were suspected of carrying different drugs will likely trigger strict scrutiny.
189
C. Zoning Decisions
Two similar examples come from Justice Kennedy, the Justice casting the deciding vote in the Court's most recent equal protection cases. In Parents Involved, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion presumed that race-conscious school zoning decisions would not be subject to strict scrutiny. 190 In Inclusive Communities eight years later, Justice Kennedy used Parents Involved to refute the notion that disparate impact liability in fair housing raised significant constitutional problems.
191 He explained that just as school boards "may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through [race-neutral] means," housing authorities may combat racial isolation with race-neutral tools, and "mere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not doom that endeavor at the outset."
192 At the same time, the Court affirmed outer limits on the means used to further racial integration. In Parents Involved, the Court invalidated an attempt to integrate schools with the use of racial classifications. 193 In Inclusive Commentators also distinguish between the use of race in suspect descriptions and racial profiling. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 50 (1999) ("Although racial identity, like hair color or attire, is an appropriate consideration in identifying suspects where an eyewitness has described a specific perpetrator of a particular crime, profiles serve a different function altogether."); Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 1999, at 34 (arguing that "[o]ur commitment to a just social order should prompt us to end racial profiling even if the generalizations on which the technique is based are buttressed by empirical evidence," but using race in suspect descriptions is acceptable because race, there, serves as "a trait linked to a particular person with respect to a particular incident. It is not a free-floating [accusation]"); see also Should remedial orders mandating racial quotas trigger strict scrutiny? There are four principles that may shed light on the inquiry: burden allocation, expressive harm, universalism, and context. Many of these principles are interrelated, so readers may disagree about the precise categorization of a court's statement in one section or another. For instance, laws that directly allocate burdens on the basis of race are more likely to generate hostility and impose visible harms. That the Court's statements are sometimes not susceptible to precise categorization is desirable and in accord with the general functions of constitutional law.
195
There is already plenty of commentary that specifies how these principles are gathered from the Court's opinions, and what they say about the viability of a facial challenge to Title VII's disparate impact provisions. 196 But Inclusive Communities calls for a more nuanced approach, and the principles also explain why disparate impact remedial orders containing racial quotas call for a more stringent form of judicial scrutiny than those that do not.
A. Burden Allocation
Allocative Motive
In determining the proper standard of review, courts often look to whether the legislature intended to distribute benefits and burdens on a racial basis. 197 The requirement of an allocative motive serves as both a causation requirement and a limiting principle. It aligns the Court's equal protection jurisprudence with its oft-repeated presumption that most legislation is constitutional, 198 and it will not be reviewed ("Plaintiffs' position is based upon a misunderstanding of the distinction between collecting demographic data so that the government may have the information it believes . . . it needs in order to govern, and governmental use of suspect classifications without a compelling interest."). 198 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (justifying a presumption of constitutionality for duly enacted statutes based on Congress's right and duty to "make its under a theory that some have called "fatal in fact." 199 And just as the causation requirement limits liability in contracts, 200 and torts, 201 it also limits the instances in which government decisions are subject to strict scrutiny. Justice Kennedy's opinions in Parents Involved 202 and Inclusive Communities 203 are standard examples of the allocative motive requirement. The usual instance of school zoning will take multiple factors into account. 204 School boards often consider raceneutral criteria such as income distributions and traffic patterns anytime they need to draw new school lines, but the resulting boundaries may have a coincidental disparate impact on racial enrollment patterns. 205 The same reasoning leads to deferential review for zoning officials in housing, who "must often make decisions based on a mix of [race-neutral] factors, both objective (such as cost and traffic patterns) and, at least to some extent, subjective (such as preserving historic architecture)."
206
Another example is the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan, 207 often discussed by commentators as a reason not to apply strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge to Title VII's disparate impact provisions. 208 That law allows students graduating in the admissions officers to de-emphasize traditional admissions criteria for other indicators of performance.
219
These concerns, which have led to dictum supporting the Top Ten Percent Plan, are mostly absent with remedial orders that mandate racial quotas. An employer with a workforce that is racially balanced could be motivated by a number of concerns. An employment practice that results in a diverse workforce raises no significant problems because it will usually be impossible to trace the employer's motive in such circumstances as complying with Title VII's disparate impact provisions. Ricci was an outlier in this context because the city admitted that it scrapped the initial test due to the racial composition of successful candidates. 220 But courts are otherwise hesitant to select "complying with Title VII's disparate impact provisions" as the motivating factor absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
221
The analysis changes altogether when a remedial order calls for a racial quota. When this is the case, the explicit requirement of the racial redistribution of a number of jobs is in the open. An apt comparison here is the difference between the use of race in suspect descriptions, which is reviewed under a deferential standard, 222 and racial profiling, which is subject to strict scrutiny. 223 Race is only one of many factors in decisions regarding employment 224 and housing. 225 Likewise, the police consider a multitude of factors when they use a suspect's description to narrow the list of people they will question, and a court might have a hard time guessing the degree to which race played a role. By contrast, race is the only factor in racial profiling and quota-based remedial orders, so neither leaves any doubt that race was the motivating factor.
Allocative Effect
Much of the analysis dealing with the requirement of an allocative motive overlaps with the requirement of an allocative effect. Courts do not use racial effects as a categorical trigger for strict scrutiny, because everything has a racial effect at some point. Rather, courts have distinguished between direct racially allocative effects, which trigger strict scrutiny, and indirect effects, which do not. A racial quota in a disparate impact remedial order is the prime example of a direct racially allocative effect: the court orders the redistribution of a number of jobs to members of a certain race and it is done. But, with the census, the Top Ten Percent Plan, and disparate impact liability in fair housing, courts will not apply strict scrutiny because the racially allocative effect is too indirect, and recognizing a constitutional claim in such cases would subject every law to invalidation.
So it is true that laws like the Ten Percent Plan cause a racial effect, but the effect is less direct-and therefore less deserving of strict judicial scrutiny-than disparate impact remedial orders that involve racial employment quotas. For instance, 75% of the seats at the University of Texas are filled by those who are enrolled under the Top Ten Percent Plan. 227 Unsuccessful white applicants may argue that the plan reduced the number of seats available to those considered under holistic review. But if the University of Texas did away with its current use of racial classifications at the holistic review stage, then unsuccessful applicants would have a hard time proving that they were disadvantaged on the basis of illegitimate preferences at either the Top Ten Percent Plan stage or the holistic review stage of the application process. The same principle applies with census questionnaires and disparate impact liability in fair housing. Like racial quotas in remedial orders, both data gathered from the census and fair housing decisions may have a racial effect at some point. 228 But the effect is much more indirect.
B. Expressive Harm
The Equal Protection Clause is concerned with more than just racial allocation.
229
Expressive harm is a potential characteristic of the government's message: both the message conveyed and the message felt. 230 The doctrine recognizes that there is more /detail/disparate-impact-and-the-rule-of-law-does-disparate-impact-liability-make -everything-illegal-event-audiovideo. 227 231 Consider the custom of gift-giving. Many Americans exchange gifts for special occasions. 232 But giving money may be the better option for those concerned solely with utility. That's because many gifts end up in the hands of someone who has no use for them, or someone who may well have preferred buying a different item with the money used to buy the gift. 233 Economists call this inefficient outcome "deadweight loss," and the amount of it that results from gift-giving leaves them rubbing their eyes. 234 But there's more to gifts than their utility. 235 There is also an expressive benefit: you took the time to find out what someone wanted. Handing someone a twenty-dollar bill instead of a gift card of the same value to that person's favorite restaurant might show that you didn't care enough to find out where the person likes to eat. 236 That's an expressive harm.
The Court has long been concerned with the expressive harm of race-based decision-making. the Court has been cognizant of the social meaning of government action. 239 Strange as it seems, the constitutional analysis can sometimes change according to how a law is viewed. The shift in the Court's views on laws requiring disclosure of racial information provides one example. In 1964, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a law that required political candidates to list their race on the ballot. 240 Decades later, a federal court rejected a challenge to the census, and analyzed the challenge under rational basis review. 241 The doctrine of expressive harm casts light on this shift. The civil rights community had previously distrusted government efforts to collect data, viewing it as a practice likely to entrench segregation. 242 243 after which data collection measures were viewed as legitimate tools to smoke out violations of the Act. 244 Two overarching themes the Court has adopted with respect to impermissible government expressions are related: treating people as members of racial groups instead of individuals 245 and the stigmatic harm imposed by racial preferences. 246 The Court frowns upon government treatment of its citizens as members of racial groups rather than individuals. Group-based treatment is "odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality," 247 and "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike." 248 Another expressive harm deals with the stigma that preferences impose on those who benefit from such programs. Justice Brennan wrote four decades ago that such preferences "perpetuate[] disadvantageous treatment of [its] supposed beneficiaries." 249 Justice Thomas added more recently: "[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination." 250 Not every race-conscious action reveals an impermissible viewpoint. Both suspect descriptions and racial profiling involve a government actor making race-conscious decisions. But the reason why courts have treated the two differently is the degree to which they reveal group treatment. 251 Racial profiles are undeniably focused on groups, whereas suspect descriptions allow for decisions that place less emphasis on race. 252 The City of Oneonta court explained this point. To start, the suspect description originated with a private party and there was no evidence in the record suggesting that the police intended to target a minority group. 253 And because the police were seeking an offender whose race was already known, the practice did not brand other members of the race as crime prone. 254 By contrast, racial profiling ratifies an impermissible government viewpoint that some groups are more susceptible to crime. 255 As one court put it, such policies send the message that those detained are "criminals first and individuals second." 256 That is all the more reason why racial quotas in remedial orders raise significantly more problems than enjoining truly arbitrary decision-making with an incidental disparate impact. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Inclusive Communities reflects the viewpoint that race-neutral remedies, like the use of race in suspect descriptions, leave ample room for individualized treatment. Remedies imposed in disparate impact lawsuits have traditionally forced zoning officials to focus on factors that did not inject race into the process. 257 In Inclusive Communities, the Court indicated that asking the defendant in a disparate impact lawsuit to focus on race-neutral measures that serve the defendants objectives just as well does not express an impermissible government viewpoint. 258 But that analysis says little about the viewpoint the government expresses when it redistributes opportunities on the basis of race alone.
Yet, another problem with quota-based remedies is that there are generally more claimants than beneficiaries. For example, in Lewis v. City of Chicago, there were around 6,000 claimants for only 132 spots. 259 As a consequence, the beneficiaries were selected by lot, and the pool of claimants included every black applicant. 260 In Gratz v. Bollinger, 261 the Court struck down an admissions program that gave all under-represented minorities an additional twenty points out of the one hundred points needed to guarantee admission into the school. 262 As the Court explained, allowing all members of certain races an additional benefit based on their race is unconstitutional, even if it is not a guarantor of success for all applicants. The remedial order in Lewis is more group-focused, and therefore more subjugating, than the affirmative action program in Gratz. In Gratz, the race-based bonus was just one part of the scoring process, and was used in conjunction with merit-based factors [Vol. 24:1169 1. Universal Benefits A court examines the universal benefit of a law by looking at the degree to which it emphasizes commonality. Here, the Supreme Court is telling lawyers to frame arguments in terms of benefiting everyone, 282 thereby reducing the anxieties inherent in a pluralistic society. 283 It is therefore hardly surprising that briefs supporting affirmative action programs after Grutter emphasized the common benefits that affirmative action programs supposedly flow to people of all races. 284 There is no reason to expect that the universal benefits of a diverse workforce, if any, 285 would be different depending on whether the employer achieved its goals through a disparate impact remedial order or by other means. The difference comes in terms of pluralistic costs.
Pluralistic Costs
Laws that incite hostility are more susceptible to invalidation. 286 The census, the Top Ten Percent Plan, and disparate impact liability in fair housing do not involve visible victims, 287 likely a prime reason that the Court has not subjected them to strict scrutiny. By contrast, disparate impact lawsuits containing racial quotas in their remedial orders usually generate a significant amount of controversy.
To see how this is so, one would have to look no further than the cases of quotabased remedial orders provided earlier in this Article. 288 The Austin Firefighters' Union, for example, strongly objected to the consent decree in United States v. City of Austin, 289 and even attempted to intervene in litigation. 290 Union representatives complained that they were strong-armed by city officials, who told them in collective bargaining talks that if the city did not get what it wanted during the negotiations, it would have to reach its objective by ceding to a sham lawsuit and achieve its [Vol. 24:1169
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, court decisions regarding the census, suspect descriptions, school zoning, and now fair housing will likely serve as fodder for those advocating for the far-reaching remedy of racial quotas in disparate impact litigation under Title VII. But those who apply the equal protection principles from those decisions should readily come to the conclusion that racial quotas in disparate impact remedial orders will be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
First, disparate impact remedial orders involving racial quotas impermissibly allocate on the basis of race. In stark contrast to disparate impact remedies in fair housing, which have only been used to impose race-neutral measures, remedial orders involving racial quotas in employment directly allocate goods on an explicitly racial basis.
Second, remedial orders containing racial quotas, because of their explicit mention of race, carry much greater expressive harm than remedies that are race-neutral. As the Court has said time and again, explicitly racial measures often reveal impermissible government viewpoints and stigmatize even those who benefit from racial preferences. Thus, remedial orders like the one found in the City of Austin case should be subject to strict scrutiny.
Third, the principle of universalism does not warrant deferential review for quota-based remedies in disparate impact. The pluralistic costs are minimal in cases in which the courts have applied deferential review, but disparate impact remedial orders with racial quotas have generally led to, unseemingly, "race wars" in cities across the United States.
Fourth, court decisions on the use of race in police investigations and zoning decisions can be explained by context, including the inevitable occurrence of such acts, and the lack of workable alternatives. But there is no reason to think that an employer must resort to racial quotas in Title VII disparate impact cases, since such extreme remedies have been virtually non-existent in Fair Housing cases over the last forty years.
At the end of the day, courts will apply principles of burden allocation, expressive harm, universalism, and context in determining the standard of review for a race-conscious law. But just as those principles have allowed deferential review for the census, suspect descriptions, and school zoning decisions, they command strict scrutiny for explicit racial quotas found in some disparate impact remedial orders. Such orders must be closely analyzed under the most stringent form of judicial review.
